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ABSTRACT. When corporate payout is taxed, internal equity (retained 
earnings) is cheaper than external equity (share issues). If there are no 
perfect substitutes for equity finance, payout taxes may therefore have an 
effect on the investment of firms. High taxes will favor investment by 
firms who can finance internally. Using an international panel with many 
changes in payout taxes, we show that this prediction holds well. Payout 
taxes have a large impact on the dynamics of corporate investment and 
growth. Investment is “locked in” in profitable firms when payout is 
heavily taxed. Thus, apart from any level effects, payout taxes change the 
allocation of capital. 
 
JEL No. G30, G31, H25. 
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1.  Introduction 
Corporate payout, in the form of dividends or as repurchases of shares, is subject to taxation in most 
countries. Such taxes on corporate payout drive a wedge between the cost of internal and external equity 
(retained earnings and equity issues, respectively). Higher payout taxes raise the cost of capital for firms 
using external equity to fund investment relative to those using internal equity. Therefore, higher payout 
taxes are expected to “lock in” investment in profitable firms, at the expense of firms with investment 
opportunities which would require external equity financing to undertake. 
The empirical relevance of this simple prediction has not been well tested. Despite the large amount 
of theoretical and empirical research about the effect of dividend taxes on the level of investment and on 
the valuation of firms (see, e.g., Auerbach, 1979a, 1979b; Bradford, 1981; Chetty and Saez, 2010; 
Feldstein, 1970; Guenther and Sansing, 2006; Harberger, 1962; King, 1977; Korinek and Stiglitz, 2009; 
Poterba and Summers, 1984 and 1985), little is known about the effects of such taxes on the allocation of 
investment across firms. Yet, the theoretical prediction is very clear: higher payout taxes will increase the 
wedge between the cost of internal and external equity, and firms with more costly external financing will 
exhibit greater investment cash flow sensitivities. Put differently, payout taxes favor investment financed 
by retained earnings over investment financed by equity issues. This can matter for the productivity and 
nature of investment if a) debt finance is an imperfect substitute for equity (in other words, if the Miller 
Modigliani propositions do not hold), b) different firms have different investment opportunities, c) the 
marginal investor is subject to taxation, and d) firms make equity payouts while the tax is in effect. All 
these conditions have empirical support.
1 But are such frictions important enough for this to matter in 
practice for investment levels? This paper aims to test the extent to which the “lock in” effect of payout 
taxes matters empirically.  
There are several challenges in testing how payout taxes affect the cross-firm allocation of 
investment. First, large changes in the US tax code are rare. The 2003 tax cut has provided a suitable 
natural experiment for testing how dividend levels responded to taxes (see Chetty and Saez, 2005 and 
Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, 2007), but investment is a more challenging dependent variable than 
dividends, so the experiment may not provide sufficient statistical power for examining investment 
responses. First, unlike dividends, investment is imperfectly measured by accounting data that, for 
                                                      
1 Regarding the imperfect substitutability between debt and equity, see e.g. Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Regarding the variation in investment opportunities across firms, see e.g. Coase (1937) and Zingales (2000). 
Firms with limited access to internal equity may include entrepreneurial firms and firms with strong growth 
opportunities. Regarding the taxability of the marginal investor, see e.g. our Section 4.3. Note also that in many 
countries outside the U.S. and the U.K. (for example, in Germany and Austria) investment funds managing private 
investors’ money are ultimately taxed like private investors. Regarding payout, many firms pay dividends or 
repurchase shares every year. Others may plan to do so in the future. Korinek and Stiglitz (2010) consider firms’ 
ability to time their payout around tax changes. 2 
 
example, leave out many types of intangible investment such as that in brands and human capital. This 
means that available empirical proxies (e.g. capital expenditures) are noisy estimates of the true variable 
of interest. Second, much investment is lumpy and takes time to build, so any response to tax changes is 
likely slow and more difficult to pinpoint in time. This suggests that a longer time window may be 
necessary (the payout studies used quarters around the tax change). Third, however, investment is 
affected by business cycles and other macro-economic trends, so extending the window around a single 
policy change introduces more noise from other sources, and may not provide better identification.  
We address these challenges by using an international dividend and capital gains tax data set covering 
25 countries over the 19-year period 1990-2008 (Jacob and Jacob, 2011). This data set contains fifteen 
substantial tax reforms and 67 discrete changes in the dividend or capital gains tax rate. With so many tax 
changes, we have sufficient variation to study the effects of payout taxes on the investment allocation. We 
use this tax data base to test if the allocation of investment across firms with and without access to 
internal equity depends on payout taxes. We first run non-parametric (NP) tests that contrast the 
investment by the two groups of firms around tax reforms. We focus on events where payout taxes 
changed by at least three percentage points and compare the five years preceding the tax change with the 
two years following it. There are 15 events with payout tax reductions. The mean tax drop is 9.8 
percentage points (median 5.5). There are 14 tax increase events with a tax change of 8.4 percentage 
points (median 5.6). We sort firms into quintiles of the ratio of cash flow to assets in each country-year 
cell. We then calculate average investment over lagged assets for each quintile. There is no trend in 
investment for any of the quintiles during the five year period preceding the tax events. After the tax cuts, 
we observe a significant convergence of the investment rate of high and low cash flow firms (top and 
bottom quintiles). In other words, firms with limited internal equity increase their investment relative to 
firms with plenty of internal equity. This is consistent with the tax wedge theory, and suggests that low 
taxes favor firms with limited access to internal equity. In contrast, following increases in payout taxes 
there is a divergence of investment of high and low cash flow firms. The estimated effects appear large in 
both sets of tax reforms. On average, the difference in investment between low and high cash flow firms 
increases from 5.33% (of assets) to 7.59% following a payout tax increase – a 42% increase. When 
payout taxes are cut, the difference in investment falls from 7.27% to 5.54% – a decrease by 31%. In 
other words, for the typical large tax change, a large quantity of investment is estimated to get displaced. 
When taxes go up, investment flows from firms with limited access to internal equity to those with more 
internal equity, and vice versa for tax reductions. These non-parametric results are consistent with the 
predictions of the tax wedge theory. 
Because the panel data set contains multiple tax change events, we can estimate not just the mean 
treatment effect of a tax change, but also ranges. Only two (three) of the 15 (14) tax decreases (increases) 3 
 
have difference-in-difference effects that are in conflict with our hypothesis. The other estimates agree 
with the tax wedge hypothesis, and many point estimates are large: one third of tax decreases events 
reduce the difference in the investment rate of high and low cash flow firms by at least 2.5 percentage 
points. About 40% of the tax raises are associated with a point estimate for the increased wedge between 
high and low cash flow firms by more than 2.5 percentage points.
2 In other words, the effect of tax 
changes on the relative investment of firms varies quite a bit across events, and is sometimes large. We 
can also use the individual difference-in- difference point estimates to do non-parametric tests. For 
example, a sign test of the frequencies with which estimates are positive and negative suggest that we can 
reject that an increase and a decrease of the investment rate difference are equally likely after a tax 
increase (decrease) at the 5% (1%) level of statistical significance. 
We also use linear regressions to produce parametric estimates of the effect of taxes on relative 
investment of rich and poor firms. Unlike the non-parametric tests, the regressions use data from all years, 
and can integrate both tax increases and decreases in the same specifications. The two methods also put 
different weight on observations (equal-weighting tax changes vs. equal-weighting firm–years),  For our 
baseline tests, we regress investment on firm controls, fixed effects for firms and for country-year cells, 
and the interaction of the payout tax rate with cash flow. Thanks to the panel structure of the data set, we 
can allow the coefficient on cash flow to vary across countries and years, in essence replicating the 
identification strategy of the many studies exploiting the 2003 tax cut in the US, but for the whole panel 
of 25 countries times 19 years. The estimated coefficient for the tax-cash flow interaction variable is 
consistently positive and significant. In other words, the higher payout taxes are, the stronger is the 
tendency for investment to occur where cash flows are high. As predicted by the tax wedge theory, payout 
taxes “lock in” investment in firms generating earnings and cash flow. The estimated magnitudes are 
large. For example, going from the 25
th percentile of payout tax (15.0%) to the 75
th percentile (32.2%) 
implies that the effective coefficient on cash flow increases by 0.029, an increase by 33% over the 
conditional estimate at the 25
th percentile. Like the NP results, this implies that payout taxes have an 
important effect on the allocation of capital across firms. 
We report extensive robustness tests for these results. For most tests, we report regression results with 
three alternative tax rates, with similar results. The results also hold for alternative measures of the ability 
to finance out of internal resources (e.g. net income instead of cash flow), as well as when controlling for 
the corporate income tax rate and its interaction with cash flow. We also collect economic policy controls 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). This is to address endogeneity concerns, i.e. 
                                                      
2Not all tax changes produce point estimates in the predicted direction. This is what we would expect if the 
effect on investment is difficult to estimate, and in line with the motivation for our empirical design: we need a 
multitude of events because the statistical precision using a single tax change is relatively low.  4 
 
to ensure that tax changes are not just fragments of wider structural changes in an economy that change 
firms' investment behavior around tax reforms. This test shows that payout tax changes appear to have 
their own very unique and economically significant effect on the allocation of investment (assuming we 
have identified the relevant set of policy variables). We further ensure robustness to alternative regression 
frameworks and specification strategies. We also ensure robustness of our model predictions to cash 
investments, and we address concerns about the potential impact of measurement error in investment 
opportunities. 
We also examine cross-sectional differences in the response to taxes. We attempt to identify firms 
whose marginal source of funding is likely to be external equity based on three measures. First, we 
consider predicted equity sales. Second, we look at historical equity issuance. We exploit the fact that 
such issuance is persistent, so that classifying firms by recent equity issuance likely indicates their ability 
to issue in the future.
3 Third, we classify firms within the two lowest quintiles of the age and the size 
distribution in one country-year as more likely to use external equity (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). For all 
three classifications, there is a sizable difference in the effect of taxation on the marginal source of funds 
for investment between old view firms and new view firms. The cash flow coefficient is sensitive to tax 
rates only for firms that are more likely to use external equity. This confirms the mechanism behind the 
differential responses of investment to tax rates that we have documented earlier. 
Finally, we examine how quantities of equity raised respond to taxes. If our identifying assumptions 
are valid, and if we have identified real variation in the effective taxation as perceived by firms, we would 
expect to see a drop in equity issuance when taxes go up. We find exactly this: When taxes are high, 
equity issuance tends to be low. This supports the interpretation that the tax variation we pick up is 
meaningful.  
Our results are related to the debate about the impact of payout taxes on the level of investment 
between the “old view” (Harberger, 1962, 1966; Feldstein, 1970; Poterba and Summers, 1985) and the 
“new view” (Auerbach, 1979a; Bradford, 1981; King, 1977). This debate can be understood in terms of 
different assumptions about the marginal source of investment financing. To simplify, the old view 
assumes that marginal investment is financed by equity issues, so that payout taxes raise the cost of 
capital and reduce investment. The new view assumes that marginal investment is financed by retained 
earnings, so that payout taxes do not reduce investment. In practice, firms are likely to differ in their 
                                                      
3 In our data, firms that issued any equity in the previous year are 3.9 times as likely to issue again next year. 
Firms issuing more than 5% of assets over the last year are 7.7 times as likely to do so again this year. These 
numbers probably reflect capital needs as well as access to the market. There are several possible reasons for this. 
Issuing costs are high for equity (see Asquith and Mullins, 1986 and Chen and Ritter, 2000). However, some firms 
find it less costly to issue equity, for example because they have a favorable stock valuation (see Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler, 2003). 5 
 
ability to finance investment with internal resources (e.g. Lamont, 1997). If they do, the tax rate will 
affect the allocation of investment. 
Our results have three main implications. First, it appears that payout taxes influence the allocation of 
capital across firms. High taxes lock in capital in those firms that generate internal cash flows, ahead of 
those firms that need to raise outside equity. If firms have different investment opportunities, this means 
that tax rate changes alter the type of investments being made. For example, high payout taxes may favor 
established industries. We consider the allocation across firms an important topic in itself, but there may 
also be some suggestive implications for aggregate investment. Our results generally point to the 
relevance of payout taxes for investment (for a subset of firms). Second, the effect of payout taxes is 
related to both access to the equity market and governance. Firms that rely on access to equity markets as 
a source of finance, “old view” firms, are the most affected by tax changes. Firms whose only source of 
equity finance is internal are less affected by taxes, as predicted by the “new view”. A final source of 
heterogeneity is governance. Firms where decision makers have low financial stakes are less affected by 
tax changes, reflecting their propensity to make investment decisions for reasons unrelated to the cost of 
capital. Third, the relation between cash flow and investment (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 
1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) appears to partially reflect the difference in the after-tax cost of capital 
between firms with and without access to inside equity.
 
2.  The model – payout taxation and investment decisions  
We formalize our predictions in a simple one-period model (similar to, but simpler than, Lewellen 
and Lewellen, 2006). We consider a firm that has the opportunity to invest $1 at time 1 and receive 1+π at 
time 2.
4 The net return π is subject to corporate tax at the rate τ . In period 2, the firm returns all cash to 
investors. We assume that all payout of profits, be it through dividends or share repurchases, is fully 
taxable at corporate payout tax rate τ . If the firms distributes cash only as dividends, τ  equals the tax 
rate on dividends τ   . If the firm uses share repurchases to return capital to investors, τ  equals the tax 
rate on capital gains τ  , as long as the tax basis is zero (we generalize this below). Returning paid-in 
capital has no tax consequences. For simplicity, we refer to this payout as a dividend. Investors have 
access to an investment of similar risk yielding a rate of return r  , taxed at rate τ  on this investment. Let 
r r   1‐τ   represent the after-tax return on investors’ alternative investment. 
The model predictions depend on the firm's availability of internal funds to finance the investment. 
We consider two cases: a firm without and with sufficient internal resources (retained earnings) to fund 
                                                      
4 The investment opportunity can be thought of as an investment in the firm’s production technology. The 
model may apply to financial assets, including cash, but subject to possible caveats. We discuss this in Section 2.2 
below. 6 
 
investment. In the first case, the firm has zero cash and must issue equity in order to undertake the 
investment.
5 This assumption about the marginal source of investment financing corresponds to “old 
view” models of payout taxation and the level of investment (Harberger, 1962, 1966; Feldstein, 1970; 
Poterba and Summers, 1985). This firm can raise $1 at time 1, produce 1+π at time 2, of which 1 
π 1‐τ   remains after paying corporate taxes. The firm makes a dividend payment in the same amount. 
The cash flow to investors after payout tax becomes 1 π   1 ‐ τ    1‐τ  . Alternatively, investors can 
make the alternative investment, receiving r. The firm should invest if: 
  π 1‐τ   1‐τ   r . (1) 
The firm without access to internal funding considers both corporate and payout-related taxes when 
deciding if it is optimal to invest. We can use equation (1) to derive an expression for the firm’s cost of 
capital (which coincides with the cost of equity in this simple model without debt). If the required return 
is r, the cost of capital is: 
  r   r
 
  ‐   . (2) 
The minimum required return on the investment increases following an increase in payout taxes 
(recall that r captures the risk of the project). As a result, investment of firms who issue equity to finance 
investment (“old view” firms) should decrease following an increase in payout taxes.  
In the second case, we consider a firm with access to retained earnings. This assumption corresponds 
to the “new view” of payout taxation (Auerbach, 1979a; Bradford, 1981; King, 1977). The model 
predictions change when a firm has the ability to finance investment using internal funds. This firm 
makes a choice between paying out a $1 (taxable) dividend in period 1 or investing in the project in order 
to return the after tax cash flow of 1 π   1 ‐ τ    as a taxable dividend in period 2. If the firm returns the $1 
in period 1, investors receive  1‐τ   which they can invest at return r. The firm should invest if: 
   1   π 1‐τ    1‐τ    1 r   1‐τ   
Note that payout in either alternative is completely subject to payout tax  1‐τ  . The investment 
condition therefore becomes: 
  π 1‐τ   r  (3) 
For firms with internal cash, the tax rate on payout is irrelevant to investment decisions (this is the 
standard new view result). The cost of capital for a firm that uses internal equity is: 
  r   r  (4) 
                                                      
5 One concern about this assumption is that firms might finance marginal investment by debt if equity issues 
are taxed unfavorably and if debt and equity are (close) substitutes. Regarding the imperfect substitutability between 
debt and equity, see e.g. Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976). We discuss this issue more in our robustness 
section. 7 
 
In this case, the cost of capital is not affected by payout taxes and lower than for firms with external 
equity. This produces the standard new view result that the investment of firms that can fund all 
investment internally using retained earnings is unaffected by payout taxes.  
This result may seem unrealistic. For example, a firm may be able to fund investment from profits 
today, but still consider external equity a possible source of funding tomorrow and thus relevant for the 
cost of capital and investment. Also, the above result is sensitive to the assumption that repurchases are 
taxable (e.g. requiring that the tax basis of shareholders be lower than the current stock price) and to 
general equilibrium effects
6. We do not aim to test tax effects on aggregate investment of either old or 
new view firms. In fact, we are interested in the difference between the two types of firms. This follows 
directly from the two results for old view and new view firms: the after-tax cost of capital is lower for 
firms with inside equity. More formally, the derivative of r ‐r  with respect to payout taxes is positive. In 
other words, payout taxes create a wedge between the investment criteria (cost of capital) of the two types 
of firms. This yields the central conjecture we aim to test. 
Hypothesis: The difference in investment between firms with that can fund investment internally 
using retained earnings (“new view firms”) and those that need to raise external equity (“old view 
firms”) is increasing in payout tax rates. 
We refer to this prediction as the tax wedge theory. We believe this hypothesis is more robust to 
changes in the assumptions (see several examples below) than either of the inferences made for old and 
new view firms in isolation. We also believe it is of particular interest, since firms with and without 
internal funding ability are likely to vary systematically in terms of investment opportunities, so that a 
shift in the relative cost of capital, and the associated investment response, can be economically 
important. We next discuss several extensions, limitations and caveats of the model. 
2.1. Tax basis effects 
We developed this result assuming that payout is taxed. However, in many countries, investors can 
avoid some payout taxes, especially for payout in the form of repurchases (see Lewellen and Lewellen, 
2006 as well as Rydqvist, Spizman and Strebulaev, 2010). Let us consider the case where not all capital 
gains are taxable. Assume that a firm can return cash through repurchases, that all shareholders are 
taxable investors, and that all shareholders have a tax basis, i.e. ratio of the tax basis of the shares (usually 
                                                      
6 In a general equilibrium setting where aggregate investment is not fixed, but determined in equilibrium, the 
investment of new view firms will be indirectly affected by payout taxes that they do not pay. To see this, imagine 
that here are two firms in an economy, and that one reduces investment (the old view firm faces higher payout taxes 
and invests less). Then, the opportunities for investment in the other firm improves for one of three channels: 
through capital markets (the savings needs of households push up investment in new view firms, mediated through a 
lower r) or through product markets (retrenchment by some old view firms makes it easier for new view firms to 
make money, i.e. increases) or through labor markets (it becomes easier/cheaper to hire and increases). 8 
 
acquisition price) to the current value of shares, of β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1).
7 Then, the effective tax rate on returns is 
τ   τ   β. The cost of capital for firms who finance marginal investments by internal equity is: 
  r   
 
  ‐       r   (5) 
Intuitively,  β determines how much additional payout tax is triggered by a share repurchase or 
dividend payment. If β is zero, there is no additional payout tax. As long as β<1, the result that internal 
equity is cheaper than external equity holds up. In other words, as long as payout is taxed, our result 
holds. Miller and Scholes (1978) argue that payout taxes can be avoided completely, and this would 
remove our predictions about relative investment and cost of capital. It is worth noting that the US 
treasury raises significant resources from both dividend taxes and capital gains taxes, suggesting that in 
practice, US investors at least are unable to avoid payout taxes. 
In our empirical test, we use cash flow as a proxy for the firm's ability to finance investments using 
internal funds. Our model predicts that firms with high cash flow (who face r ) are expected to be less 
sensitive to changes in payout taxes than firms with low cash flow (who face r ), regardless of the exact 
tax basis, as long as there is some tax liability created by distributing cash to shareholders. However, the 
magnitude of the tax wedge will depend on the average tax basis, and we do take this into consideration in 
the robustness section. 
2.2. Financial investments (cash holdings) 
Our model could apply to physical investment as well as cash holdings. We can easily consider this 
inside the model. It is useful to first disregard payout taxes, i.e. consider a new view firm. Recall that 
equation (3) states that new view firms prefer payout to internal investment if π 1‐τ   r  where 
r r   1‐τ   is the after-tax return for investors. Unlike most firm investment, cash investments can be 
done at largely similar terms by a firm’s owners, even if they are small and dispersed. Thus, for cash, we 
might believe that the firm’s return and investor’s return coincide: π r   in which case equation (3) 
would suggest to keep cash outside of the firm. This implies that we can decide if cash holdings should be 
held inside the firm, from a tax point of view, based on whether r   1‐τ   r   1‐τ  . In other words, if the 
return to cash is similar, taxes should determine the location of cash investment. This effect should 
combine with the effect of internal vs. external equity finance that we highlight in the basic model, so that 
we predict that low cash flow firms should hold more cash when payout-taxes are low.  
To test this theory, we have to compare corporate income tax rates to taxation of personal income. 
We also need to correct for the possibility that corporations have better investment opportunities (i.e. at 
the same tax rate, it may be slightly better to hold cash inside the firm if it can get better returns, for 
                                                      
7 If >1, investors have a taxable loss. We rule this case out for simplicity. 9 
 
example through lower management fees). Finally, saving of cash is only observed for financially 
constrained firms (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004), so we need to condition on being 
constrained to have confidence in the prediction that payout taxes raises cash. We examine these 
predictions in Section 5.4 below. 
2.3. Agency problems 
Chetty and Saez (2010) present a model based on agency conflict between owners and managers, 
where payout taxes can affect investment in rich firms through shifting the CEO’s choice between taxed 
payout and untaxed empire building (which involves over-investing). In this model, poorly governed rich 
firms may show perverse responses to taxes (i.e. higher investment when taxes are high). In this model, 
for well governed firms the relative investment of rich and poor firms is increasing in taxes (as above), 
and also for poorly governed firms (due to extra channel off shifting private benefit consumption). Thus, 
the predictions we test in this paper are consistent with this model as well (see Tables A.XIV to A.XVI in 
the Online Appendix). Although, to be precise, our findings do not necessarily support an empire building 
agency problem over other possibilities. See e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005) for a different agency 
problem between investors and managers. 
2.4. Debt finance 
Several other factors can limit the relevance of the proposed effects of payout taxes. In particular, if 
firms face expensive equity, they may try to substitute by funding investment with debt. If debt is a good 
substitute for firms that need funding, the effect of taxes for required returns and investment decisions 
will be muted. Several factors could limit this: investing firms may not have suitable collateral for 
borrowing, may have already used up their debt capacity, or may be reluctant to increase leverage. We 
test the relevance for our results of potential substitution to debt financing in the robustness section 
below. 
3.  Taxes on corporate payout across countries 
3.1. Tax variation 
The prerequisite for a useful study of the relationship between payout tax policies and the allocation 
of investment across countries is a sufficient degree of identifying variation in dividend and capital gains 
tax regimes and tax rates both across countries and within countries across time. Tables 1 and 2, and 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate that this is the case for the 25 countries scrutinized in this study. 
We count five major tax systems in our data set: classical corporate tax systems, shareholder relief 
systems, dividend tax exemption systems, and full and partial imputation systems. Classical corporate 
taxation systems (for example, currently used in Ireland, and previously in the Netherlands or Spain) are 
characterized by double taxation of corporate profits, that is, income, before it is distributed as dividends, 10 
 
is taxed at the corporate level, and later taxed again as dividend income at the individual shareholder 
level. This contrasts with shareholder relief systems (for example, currently used in the US, Japan, and 
Spain) which aim to reduce the full economic burden of double taxation that applies under a pure classical 
system. For example, at the individual shareholder level, reduced tax rates on dividends received or 
exclusion of a proportion of dividend income from taxation are common forms of shareholder tax relief. 
Under an imputation system (for example, used currently in Australia and Mexico, and previously in 
France), taxes paid by a corporation are considered as paid on behalf of its shareholders. As a result, 
shareholders are entitled to a credit (the “imputation credit”) for taxes already paid at the corporate level. 
That is, shareholders are liable only for the difference between their marginal income tax rate and the 
imputation rate. Full and partial imputation systems are distinguished by the nature of the imputation 
credit, which may be the full corporate tax or only a fraction thereof. In dividend tax exemption systems 
(currently only Greece in our sample) dividend income is generally not taxed. 
Table 1 shows that there have been many changes in payout tax systems over the last two decades. 
While in the first half of our sample period the classical corporate tax system dominates, from 2005 the 
shareholder relief system is the most widespread tax system. While there are only five shareholder relief 
systems in place in 1990, shareholder relief systems can be found in almost 70% of the countries (17) in 
our sample at the end of the sample period. The reduction in the prevalence of full and partial imputation 
systems from 11 in 1990 to only 6 in 2008 is largely due to the harmonization of European tax laws that 
necessitated an abolition of differences in the availability of imputation credits for domestic and foreign 
investors across EU member states. 
3.2. Tax rates 
The significant trend from imputation systems and classical corporate tax systems to shareholder 
relief systems naturally coincides with the development of the absolute taxation of dividend income and 
capital gains. Yet, as Tables 1 and 2 illustrate, tax reforms are not necessarily accompanied by changes in 
the effective taxation of dividends and capital gains. Rather, much of the dynamics in dividend and capital 
gains taxation relate to pure rate changes. Changes occur frequently absent any tax system reforms. 
In this study, we are interested in the effective tax burden on dividend income and capital gains faced 
by individual investors. One concern with our analysis is that the tax rates we measure do not have 
sufficiently close correspondence with actual share ownership of our sample firms. Rydqvist, Spizman 
and Strebulaev (2010) point to the reduced role of the taxable investors in recent decades. They suggest 
that the influence of private investors’ taxes has likely been falling through time. In the extreme, if the 
marginal investor for every firm is a (tax neutral) institution, individual shareholder taxation should not 
matter. If this is true for our sample firms, we would find no effect. To the extent that we identify an 11 
 
effect of payout taxes, we can conclude taxable investors have some impact on firm prices (at least for a 
subset of firms).
8 
Similarly, the increasing role of cross-country stock holdings might affect our ability to isolate true 
tax rates faced on payout by equity owners through the tax rules for domestic investors. Our data do not 
allow us to identify the fraction of foreign ownership in a company. However, since there is strong 
evidence of a substantial home bias in national investment portfolios (see, for example, French and 
Poterba, 1991; Mondria and Wu, 2010), we believe domestic tax rules are likely the most important 
source of time series variation in tax rates. The tax rates applicable to domestic investors is the most 
plausible approximation for the typical investor’s tax burden, especially for smaller firms, where 
international ownership is likely lower.  
The first, immediate, observation from Table 2 is that the level of taxation on dividends and share 
repurchases varies considerably across countries and time. Tax reforms per se are not necessarily 
accompanied by changes in the effective rate of taxation of dividends and capital gains. As we report in 
Panel A of Table 2, the highest average tax rates on dividend income over the sample period can be 
observed in the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Ireland. Peak values range from 66.2% 
in Sweden (1990), to 60.9% in Denmark (1990), to 60.0% in the Netherlands (1990-2000), to 47.3% in 
Korea (1990-1993), to 46% in Spain (1990/1991, 1993/1994). Over the same period investors faced the 
lowest average tax burden in Greece – a dividend tax exemption country and the only mandatory dividend 
country in our sample – and in Mexico, Finland, New Zealand, and Norway. The within-country standard 
deviation ranges from 10.8% to 20.5%, and the within-country differences between maximum and 
minimum tax rates from 25% to 38%, for Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, the US and Finland, 
which provide the most variation in dividend tax rates over the sample period (Table 3, Panel A, and 
Figure 1). In contrast, we observe the most stable tax treatment of dividends in Greece, Mexico, Austria, 
Poland, and Portugal, where the personal income tax rate fluctuates within a narrow band of at most 5 
percentage points difference between peak and lowest taxation over the sample period. On average, the 
difference between maximum and minimum dividend tax rate in our sample countries in 1990-2008 is 
19.9%, thus underpinning the substantial time-variant differences in dividend tax rates.  
Capital gains taxation across countries is special in many respects and often strongly intertwined with 
the legal treatment of share repurchases. For example, in some European countries share repurchases were 
either difficult to implement (for example, France) or illegal (for example, Germany and Sweden) until 
                                                      
8 The Rydqvist et al prediction seems to be borne out in US dividend policy: Chetty and Saez (2005) and 
Perez-Gonzalez (2003) show that firms with a large share of institutional (tax exempt) ownership exhibit smaller 
changes in policy after the 2003 tax cut. For our sample, which contains many non-US firms, tax exempt investors 
may be a smaller factor. Unfortunately, we lack the requisite ownership data to test whether there is a similar pattern 
in our sample. 12 
 
the turn of the 3rd millennium (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; DeRidder, 2009). Moreover, in some countries 
with high taxes on dividends and low capital gains taxes (such as in Belgium, in the Netherlands before 
2001, and in Switzerland since 1998), specific tax provisions existed to discourage share repurchases. In 
Japan, restrictions on corporate share repurchases thwarted corporations from buying back their own 
shares until enactment of a special law in 1995. Since the mid-1990s, the Japanese government has 
gradually relaxed and removed restrictions on share repurchases, originally as a part of emergency 
economic measures to revitalize the economy and its tumbling stock market (Hashimoto, 1998). In Panel 
B of Table 2 we report capital gains tax rates across our sample countries that take these effects into 
consideration. The tax rates are applicable to investors with non-substantial shareholdings and holding 
periods that qualify as long-term investments in accordance with country-specific tax legislation. We 
show that over the sample period, on average, the most unfavorable tax environment for capital gains 
prevailed in Denmark, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, and Canada, while in eight countries capital 
gains are generally tax exempt. We observe peak capital gains tax rates in the Netherlands (1990-2000), 
Australia (1990-1999), Poland (1994-1996), and Switzerland (1998-2007). The range of capital gains tax 
rates is substantial – from 0.0% to 60.0%. With standard deviation greater than 14.5% and differences 
between maximum and minimum tax rate of 31% to 60%, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Poland exhibit the largest within-country variation in capital gains tax rates across countries (Table 2, 
Panel B, and Figure 2). In contrast, capital gains taxation is constant in 1990-2008 in Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, and Portugal. On average, the within-country difference between 
maximum and minimum capital gains tax rate in our sample countries in 1990-2008 is 18.7%, thus 
providing further ample identifying variation in corporate payout taxation. 
3.3. The potential endogeneity of tax changes 
Our identification (both for non-parametric and parametric tests) relies on the assumption that no 
event apart from the tax changes we study generates differential investment for firms with and without 
access to internal investment funding and changes at the same time as taxes. We are particularly 
concerned with some omitted macro-economic variable that affects the relative investment opportunities 
of these groups of firms.  
In general, it is our sense that many factors affect the politics of payout taxes. Many of these factors 
appear unrelated to corporate investment and performance. For example, the US tax cuts were motivated 
by the political philosophy of the administration. The 2000/2001 German Tax Reform Act formed part of 
a series of European Union harmonization initiatives across member states and was the first major tax 
reform in Germany since 1977. The German Tax Act changed the previous imputation system, which 
restricted the free movement of capital within Europe, and introduced an internationally more compatible 
shareholder relief system. It was not designed to affect relative investment of low cash and high cash 13 
 
firms. Of course, these are just two examples. In Section 6 below, we show that tax changes neither 
precede nor follow changes in key macro-economic variables on average. This provides some support for 
the notion that tax changes are not made due to some factor that also changes the relative investment of 
rich and poor firms. In the online appendix (Table A.I), we also show that, for example, the non-
parametric results for the German reform highlighted above are very similar to our baseline results for the 
full sample. 
4.  Data sample 
4.1. Firm data 
We source our firm-level data from the July 2009 edition of the WorldScope database and restrict our 
analysis to those countries for which conclusive tax data for the full sample period could be obtained. To 
ensure a meaningful basis for the calculation of our country-level statistics we also exclude from our 
sample firms from countries for which we have less than 10 observations after the below sample 
adjustments. The start year of our analysis is 1990 for two reasons. First, WorldScope provides less than 
comprehensive coverage of individual data items for non-U.S. firms before 1990. An earlier start may 
thus have biased our results for earlier sub-periods away from international evidence towards evidence 
from North America. Second, 1990 is a historically logical year to begin. With the transformation into 
capitalist, democratic systems in 1990, many former communist countries have only begun to incorporate 
dividends and capital gains taxation in their tax laws. We use data through 2008. We collect data on 
active as well as dead and suspended listings that fulfill our data requirements to avoid survivorship bias.  
Table 3 Panel A summarizes the composition of our sample. Financial and utility firms have motives 
to pay out cash that are different from non-financial firms (see e.g., Dittmar, 2000 and Fama and French, 
2001). We therefore restrict our sample to non-financial and also non-utility firms, defined as firms with 
SIC codes outside the intervals of 4,900-4,949 and 6,000-6,999. We also exclude firms without an SIC 
code. We further restrict our sample to firms with non-missing values for dividends to common and 
preferred shareholders, net income, sales, and total assets for at least 4 consecutive years in the 1988-2008 
period. From the original set of firms, we eliminate observations with negative or missing stock price, 
dividends, or share repurchase information, firms whose dividends exceed sales, and firms with an 
average weekly capital gain of over 1,000% in one year. To prevent extreme values and outliers from 
distorting our results we further eliminate observations of our dependent and independent variables that 
are not within the 1st and the 99th percentile of observations, and we also drop firm observations with 
total assets less than USD 10 million (see Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003).
9 This returns our basic 
                                                      
9 We obtain very similar results when winsorizing variables at different levels. Table A.II in the Appendix 
presents regression results from samples which we winsorize at the 5% and the 2% level. 14 
 
sample of 7,661 companies (81,222 firm-year observations) from 25 countries. We obtain annual personal 
income tax on dividends, and capital gains tax data for the 25 countries in our sample from Jacob and 
Jacob (2011). This comprehensive tax data set allows a heretofore unavailable, thorough analysis of 
payout taxes and the allocation of investment within a multi-country, multi-year framework.  
4.2. Investment variables 
Table 3 Panel B presents summary statistics for our investment variables. Our proxies for firm 
investment are threefold. First, we create the variable Investment, defined as additions to fixed assets 
other than those associated with acquisitions (capital expenditure, including additions to property, plant 
and equipment, and investments in machinery and equipment) normalized by total assets. Second, we 
include PPE Growth, the growth in plant, property, and equipment from t-1 to t divided by the end-of-
year t-1 assets. Our final measure of investment intensity is Asset Growth, the ratio of growth in total 
assets normalized by total assets of the firm. The numerator in our investment variables is measured one 
year after our total assets variable, the denominator. Before computing investment, we translate capital 
expenditures, PPE, and total assets in US dollars into real terms (base year 2000) by using the US GNP 
deflator (World Development Indicators, Worldbank 2010). In our sample, firms on average have capital 
expenditures amounting to 5.9% of the value of their prior year total assets. The average growth rate in 
plant, property, and equipment is 8.1% and the average growth rate in total assets of 7.9%. The range of 
values of investment is considerable – from 0.8% (10
th percentile) to 12.7% (90
th percentile) (Investment), 
-13.8% to 29.0% (PPE Growth), or -17.0% to 30.8% (Asset Growth). 
4.3. Tax variables 
Summary statistics for tax variables and controls are presented in Panel C of Table 3. All tax rates 
that we employ apply to investors with non-substantial shareholdings and holding periods that qualify as 
long-term investments in accordance with country-specific tax legislation. We construct three tax 
variables. 
Dividend Tax is the personal income tax rate on dividends in a country and year (in %). Imputation 
credits and country-specific tax exemptions available to investors have been taken into account when 
calculating this “effective” rate. For example, as per the definition of imputation systems, if the tax rate 
on dividend income is 50% and the available imputation credit is 20% then the ‘effective’ rate we employ 
is 30%. If, as for example in Germany from 2001-2008, 50% of dividend income is tax exempt, then the 
effective rate is half the statutory tax rate. Its range of values is wide, from 0% to 66.2% with mean 
dividend tax burden of 27.8% and standard deviation of 12.6%, reflecting the considerable variation of 
payout taxes across countries and over time. Effective Tax C is the country-specific weighted effective 
corporate payout tax rate (in %). It is calculated by weighting the effective tax rate on dividends and share 15 
 
repurchases by the importance of dividends and share repurchases as payout channels in a country over 
the 1990-2008 period. With this measure, we follow prior analyses of effective capital gains taxation and 
assume the effective tax rate on capital gains from share repurchases to be one-fourth of the statutory tax 
rate (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000 and Poterba, 1987). This way, we control 
for the effect that capital gains are taxed only at realization and that thus the effective capital gains tax 
rate may be significantly lower than the statutory rate.
10 The importance weight of dividends in a country 
is calculated by averaging the dividend-to-assets ratio across firms and years, and then dividing by the 
average total payout ratio (sum of dividends and share repurchases normalized by total assets) across 
firms and years. The share repurchase weight is calculated analogously.
11Average Tax C, the country 
weighted average tax, is an alternative measure of the average corporate payout tax rate (in %). It is 
obtained by weighing each year’s dividend and statutory capital gains tax rate by the relative importance 
of dividends and share repurchases as payout channels in a country over the sample period.
12 
In principle, there are reasons to prefer either of the measures. The dividend tax rate disregards the tax 
burden of repurchases, but requires no assumptions about the capital gains taxes incurred when firms 
retain earnings (i.e. retaining earnings makes the share price higher, thereby increasing current capital 
gains sellers of share, reducing future capital gains taxes for buyers). We have also rerun all our 
regressions with a weighted average of tax rates where we allowed weights to vary not only by country 
but also by year (i.e. there is one set of weights for each country-year, which is applied to tax rates that 
also may vary by country-year). The country-average tax rate may be unrepresentative if the mix of 
payout varies a lot, but raises fewer endogeneity concerns. In practice, country average tax rates and 
country-year average tax rates are very similar, and the regression results are very close, so we do not 
report results for the latter. The mean values of our Effective Tax C and Average Tax C variables are 
18.3% and 24.5%, with standard deviations 9.1% and 10.3%. Figure 3 illustrates the inverse cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of tax rates across observations in our sample. As is evident, the variation in 
tax rates is considerable by any of our three tax measures, reflecting the substantial tax experimentation 
taking place during our sample period. Because of the uneven number of firms across countries, long-
lived tax systems in large countries (the US and Japan) produce lots of data. 
                                                      
10 The assumption that the true tax rate is a quarter of the stated rate is not important to our conclusions. We get 
very similar magnitudes using other assumptions (including anything in the [0,1] range). 
11 Throughout we use cash dividends only, to avoid that differences in the tax treatment of cash and stock 
dividends infect our results. Our share repurchase variable is measured by the actual funds used to retire or redeem 
common or preferred stock and comes from the cash flow statement. 
12Weighing the capital gains tax by the prevalence of repurchases has the important advantage of automatically 
dealing with limitations on repurchases. If a country has high taxes on dividends and low taxes on repurchases, but 
severely restricts repurchases through laws and regulations, it is not fair to say that payout faces low taxes. Because 
we weight by actual quantities, we will put a small weight on the low payout tax rate. 16 
 
4.4. Other variables  
Our firm-level variables measure internal funds, capital structure, Tobin’s q, and growth. The 
availability of internal funds for investment is measured with three alternative variables: a) Cash Flow is 
the funds from operations of the company measured as the ratio of cash flow relative to total assets, b) 
Cash is defined cash holdings over total assets, and c) EBITDA measures earnings before interest, tax, and 
depreciation as a fraction of total assets. Unlike cash flow, EBITDA does not include tax payments, or 
increases in working capital. 
We measure capital structure through leverage, defined as total book debt over total book assets. We 
include Tobin’s q, the ratio between the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the 
replacement (book) value of the assets (Q). This variable can measure future profitability, that is, the 
quality of investment opportunities, as well as measurement error arising from accounting discrepancies 
between book capital and economic replacement costs. We include the natural logarithm of growth in 
sales from year t-2 to t (Sales Growth) and the relative size of a firm (Size) to control for the fact that 
smaller, high growth firms have greater profitable investment opportunities than bigger and more mature 
companies. We measure the relative size of a firm as the percentage of sample firms smaller than the firm 
for each country in each year. The numerator in our firm-level controls is measured one year after our 
total assets variable, the denominator.  
5.  Tests and results 
5.1. Internal resources and investment under different taxes: non-parametric results 
The simplest way of testing how payout taxes impact investment of firms with and without access to 
internal equity is to track firm investment around tax reforms. We do this in our panel sample by sorting 
firms in each country-year into quintiles based on the ratio of cash flow to assets. This is meant to capture 
firms’ ability to finance investment internally. We then calculate average investment over assets for each 
group in each country-year cell. We demean these ratios by country-year, to account for cross-country 
and time variation in average investment levels. Next we identify tax changes, using the country-weighted 
average payout tax rate (Average Tax C, results are similar with the two alternative measures). We focus 
on events where payout taxes changed by at least three percentage points. We exclude any events with 
fewer than thirty observations (firms) in the first year of the tax change. To avoid overlapping periods, 
and following Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), we further exclude events where a substantial tax cut 
(increase) is followed by a tax increase (cut) within two years following the original reform (Sweden 
1994/1995, Australia 2000/2001, Norway 2001/2002, and Korea 1999/2001). As Korinek and Stiglitz 
show, where firms perceive tax changes as only temporary, tax changes may generate smaller effects. 
Since tax reforms are often debated extensively, it seems possible that these tax reversals can be predicted 17 
 
by some firms and investors. We further exclude an event where the effects of the payout tax change 
overlap with a substantial corporate tax reform (Korea 1994). The remaining 29 events include 15 events 
with an average tax drop of 9.8 percentage points (median 5.5) and 14 events with an average tax increase 
of 8.4 percentage points (median 5.6).  
For every event, we track the average ratio of investment to lagged assets for firms in each quintile in 
the three years leading up to the tax change, the first year when the new rules apply, and the two years 
following the tax change. Average differences in investment between high and low cash flow firms 
around the tax events are shown in Figure 4. This graph shows the difference between the average 
investment of the low and high cash flow quintiles. The point estimate is positive in all years, i.e. the 
firms with high internal cash flows tend to invest more. There is no apparent trend in the investment rate 
difference prior to a tax reform. After a tax reform, however, the investment difference follows the 
direction of the tax change (e.g. the difference increases when taxes are raised and falls when taxes are 
reduced).  
In Table 4, we provide a detailed analysis of the relative investment of high and low cash flow firms. 
The table shows average investment (demeaned by country year) for both pre- and post-reform periods, 
and for the two groups of firms. The difference and difference-in-difference estimates are shown as well. 
The time period analyzed around tax events is from five years before to two years after the reform. The 
effects are in line with the hypothesis that higher taxes should be associated with relatively higher 
investment in those firms that have access to internal cash (Column 3, Panels A and B). After payout tax 
increases (decreases) the importance of the availability of internal resources for high investment increases 
(decreases) significantly. On average, the difference in investment between low and high cash flow firms 
increases from 5.33% to 7.59% following a payout tax increase. When payout taxes are cut, the difference 
in investment falls from 7.27% to 5.54%. These results are consistent with the prediction that corporate 
payout taxes drive a wedge between the cost of inside and outside equity and that high such taxes favor 
investment by firms with internal resources.
 
We also use a matching procedure to obtain samples of firms that are similar across the variables 
sales growth, Tobin’s q, leverage and size but that differ in cash flow. This addresses concerns that our 
non-parametric results are driven by other covariates that we do not control for in the OLS regressions. In 
Table A.III of the Appendix, we replicate results from Table 4 using a propensity score matching 
procedure and only include firms where the predicted score is above 0.5. Our results using the matched 
sample are very similar to our baseline results.  
The tax-based theory of the cost of capital wedge suggests that firms with inside funding should not 
respond to tax incentives (they are “new view” firms). Nevertheless, there is movement in the high cash 
flow group of firms in Table 4 (after a tax increase, they increase investment relative to the median firm), 18 
 
disagreeing with this prediction. There are at least five possible explanations for the investment changes 
made for high cash flow firms. First, countercyclical fiscal policy could generate patterns in aggregate 
investment consistent with Table 4. In principle, forces of political economy could produce endogeneity 
in either direction: tax increases may be more likely in contractions when the government budget is in 
deficit or in expansions when there is less political pressure to stimulate the economy with fiscal 
expansion. Investment tends to fall after tax reductions and rise after tax increases, which might be due to 
countercyclical tax policy (i.e. taxes are raised at times when investment is temporarily low and can be 
expected to increase). This type of endogeneity is a key motivator for our approach of using difference-in-
difference tests with demeaned investment. By looking at relative cross-firm differences in investment 
within a country and year, we difference out aggregate level effects.
13 A second possibility is that agency 
problems are a driver of investment in our sample firms in a way consistent with Chetty and Saez (2010): 
when tax rates go up, pressure to pay out cash is reduced, permitting managers to undertake excessive 
investment. Unlike the new view, this theory predicts that cash rich firms will respond to tax changes, and 
that aggregate investment may respond perversely to payout taxes. Third, cash rich firms may experience 
increased investment opportunities when cash poor firms withdraw. Fourth, the aggregate patterns may be 
related to the permanence of tax changes. Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) predict that a tax cut which is 
expected (by firms) to be temporary can lead to inter-temporal tax arbitrage: firms want to take advantage 
of the temporarily low tax by paying out more cash, and do so in part by reducing investment. This tax 
arbitrage is done by mature (i.e. cash rich) firms who generate the bulk of payout. Fifth, general 
equilibrium effects may link the amount of investment in different parts of the economy (see Section 2 
above). Thus, there are at least five reasons that the investment of cash rich firms is correlated with tax 
changes in the direction evident in Table 4. Importantly, under all five scenarios, our inferences based on 
the relative investment of high and low cash flow firms remains valid, i.e. the difference-in-difference 
result tells us that low payout taxes favors cash poor firms in a relative sense. We believe the lessons 
learned from the cross-sectional differences are unambiguous and of great potential importance for 
understanding corporate investment and for setting public policy. 
The estimated difference-in-difference estimate varies considerably across events. Figure 5 plots the 
empirical densities of difference-in-difference estimates for tax decrease and increase events. Two (three) 
                                                      
13 We expect that endogeneity between payout tax changes and the dispersion of investment (as opposed to the 
level) is much less likely to be important. The correlation table in Appendix A.IV supports this expectation. It also 
highlights that tax changes are at best weakly related to other macroeconomic determinants that affect the level of 
investment in an economy. Tax changes are only weakly correlated with current and prior year GDP growth and not 
significantly related to other macroeconomic variables with the potential to influence investment: inflation, and cost 
for setting up businesses (see e.g., Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer, 2010), and government 
spending measured by subsidies, military expenditures and R&D expenditures. We also implement several 
robustness tests to control for government policy in various ways (see Section 5). 19 
 
of the 15 (14) tax decreases (increases) have difference-in-difference effects that are in conflict with our 
hypothesis. On the contrary, one third of the tax decreases reduce the difference in the ratio of investment 
to assets between high and low cash flow firms by more than 2.5 percentage points – more than one third 
of the pre-tax change differences. 40% of the tax raises increased the wedge in investment between high 
and low cash flow firms by more than 2.5 percentage points, i.e. more than 50% of the pre-tax change 
differences.  
5.2. Internal resources and investment under different taxes: OLS results 
Compared to the non-parametric tests, the regressions have several advantages. They use more of the 
variation in the data, and can easily integrate both tax increases and decreases in the same specifications. 
They also allow for more detailed controls of firm heterogeneity. However, it is harder to study the 
detailed time patterns in the regression tests. By construction, regressions put more weight on those 
events that happen in countries with many firms (i.e., Japan and the US),
14 although in principle that can 
be changed by using GLS (we do not do this, although we always cluster errors by country-year, so that 
we properly take into account the amount of statistical power we have).
15 The regressions exploit all of 
the variation in tax rates that is visible in Figure 3. 
For our baseline tests, we regress investment on firm controls, fixed effects for firms and for country-
year cells, and the interaction of the payout tax rate with cash flow (we do not include the level of the tax, 
since this is absorbed by the country-year fixed effects).
16 We control for relative size, Tobin’s q, cash 
flow, and leverage. We include firm and country-year fixed effects in all our regressions. These help 
control for business cycles and other macro-economic factors. The main variable of interest is the 
interaction of internal resources (cash flow) and taxes. If taxes raise the relative cost of external equity, 
we expect high taxes to coincide with a stronger effect of cash flow on investment (since high cash flow 
means a firm can finance more investment with cheap internal equity). We therefore predict that the 
interaction coefficient should be positive. Regression results are reported in Table 5, for each of the three 
                                                      
14 We get similar results when excluding Japanese and U.S. firms (Table A.V of the Appendix). 
15 We also test the robustness of our results to regression specifications in which we cluster standard errors at 
the country level and at the country-industry level. Standard errors for the cash flow*tax interactions obtained from 
these additional specifications are very similar to those in our baseline tests. They are reported in Table A.VI of the 
Appendix. 
16 For brevity, in what follows we only discuss the results obtained by using our Investment dependent variable. 
The results using our alternative measures of investment, PPE Growth and Asset Growth, align very closely with the 
results reported in this section. The results are displayed in Table A.VII of the Appendix. We also ensure robustness 
of our results to alternative ways of scaling our measures of investment. In what follows, we use book assets to scale 
investment. As our sample includes smaller and nonmanufacturing firms with modest fixed assets and varying 
degrees of intangible assets this appeared the logical approach (cf. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003). Nevertheless, 
following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) we also investigate robustness of 
our results to using the alternative denominators property, plant, and equipment (PPE) and the book value of fixed 
assets to scale investment. The estimated coefficients for the tax-cash flow interaction variable are again consistently 
positive and significant when we use these alternative scale variables for investment. 20 
 
tax variables. The estimated coefficient for the tax-equity interaction variable is consistently positive and 
significant. In other words, the higher payout taxes are, the stronger is the tendency for investment to 
occur where retained earnings are high. As predicted by the tax wedge theory, payout taxes “lock in” 
investment in firms generating earnings and cash flow. The estimated magnitudes are large. For example, 
going from the 25
th percentile of the country-weighted average tax rate (15.0%) to the 75
th percentile 
(32.2%) implies that the effective coefficient on cash flow increases by 0.029, an increase by 32.8% over 
the conditional estimate at the 25
th percentile. Using the country-weighted effective tax rate, the effect is 
slightly larger. Going from the 25
th percentile (7.8%) to the 75
th percentile (25.2%) implies that the 
effective coefficient on cash flow increases by 0.037, 36.6% more than the baseline estimate in Table 5. 
One implication of this is that the positive cash flow coefficient in investment regressions (Rauh 2006) 
may in part reflect the higher cost of capital for firms without access to internal funds (the literature has 
mainly focused on financial constraints and varying investment opportunities as explanations of such 
coefficients).  
The high R-squared in the regressions in Table 5 stems largely from the many firm fixed effects 
included. On their own, these explain about 52% of the variation in investment rates. This suggests that 
they may be important to include, and we maintain them in all regressions. In fact, their inclusion does 
not change our estimates for the tax-cash flow interaction noticeably. 
We next use alternative measures of internal equity to check the robustness of our results thus far. We 
use the ratio of EBITDA to lagged assets as an alternative flow measure, and cash to lagged assets as a 
stock measure. Conceptually, a stock measure may be more natural than a flow measure, but cash may be 
financed on the margin by debt, in which case this becomes less informative about whether the firm has 
internal equity. In Table 6, both measures are interacted with all three tax variables. Of the six coefficient 
estimates, five are significantly different from zero. The magnitudes are smaller than those reported for 
cash flow in Table 5. We have also used further measures of internal resources, such as net income, or 
operating income. Results are similar (Table A.VIII of the Appendix). 
In a next step, we consider more flexible econometric specifications. Thanks to the panel structure of 
the data set, we can allow the coefficient on cash flow to vary across countries and years, in essence 
replicating the identification strategy of the many studies exploiting the 2003 tax cut in the US (for 
seventy nine changes across 25 countries). In Table 7 we report regressions including interactions of cash 
flow with both country and year indicator variables. Allowing the slope on cash flow to vary by country, 
we can rule out any time-invariant differences in the relation between payout taxes and the allocation of 
investment in different countries. For example, accounting differences could make cash flow less 
precisely measured (reported) in some countries, where we would therefore see a smaller slope on cash 
flow due to attenuation bias. As long as such issues are time-invariant, we can eliminate any effect on our 21 
 
results by including the interaction of country fixed effects with cash flow. The coefficient estimates for 
the cash flow-payout tax interaction remain statistically significant, and are somewhat large across the 
board (the firm controls have coefficients that are very similar to base line specifications). In fact, 
allowing these extra controls the estimated magnitudes are larger than those estimated in Table 5. The 
effective coefficient on the cash flow*tax interaction increases by 0.0002 (dividend tax), 0.0006 
(Effective Tax C), and 0.0004 (Average Tax C) when compared to the coefficients reported in Table 4. 
The R-squared increases by about twenty-five basis points. Thus, a more conservative estimation 
technique gives a more precise result in line with the predictions of the tax wedge theory. In Table A.IX 
of the Appendix we extend our analysis of the more demanding flexible specifications by using cash flow 
percentile ranks rather than the raw cash flow measure. This serves as an additional check that our results 
are not driven by the extremes of the distribution of cash flow. Coefficient estimates on our cash flow * 
tax interactions are much more significant than those for the raw CF variables.  
An auxiliary prediction of the theory of tax-induced cost differences between internal and external 
equity is that high taxes reduce the need to reallocate resources from profitable to unprofitable firms. 
Therefore, high taxes should reduce the amount of equity issues.
17 This provides an additional 
falsification test. We test this by using firm-level data on payout tax and quantities of equity raised. If we 
cannot see a negative correspondence between payout tax and amount of equity issues, it becomes less 
plausible that our tax measure properly captures variation in the cost of equity. Table 8 presents tests of 
the predicted negative relation between taxes and equity issues in our sample. To help control for market 
timing (as opposed to payout tax timing), we control for recent stock return in the equity issues 
regressions. As predicted, the coefficient estimate is negative for all three measures of taxes. A ten 
percentage point increase in the dividend tax rate (the country average payout tax rate) predicts a drop in 
equity issuance by 9% (12%) of the unconditional mean. High payout taxes are associated with both low 
investment and low equity issuance among firms with low profits. This is consistent with taxes as a driver 
of the cost of capital. It also suggests one channel through which the differential investment responses to 
taxes come about: with lower taxes, domestic stock markets reallocate capital to firms without access to 
internal cash. 
5.3. Difference-in-difference analysis: old view firms vs. new view firms 
We next sort firms by their likely access to the equity market. This is an important distinguishing 
feature between new view and old view models. According to the new view, all firms finance internally 
                                                      
17 The same prediction applies to payout: lower taxes should be associated with more payout. However, this 
prediction is less unique. If firms perceive tax changes as predictable, they may attempt to time payout to times 
when taxes are low (e.g., Korinek and Stiglitz, 2009). It therefore seems that testing equity issues provides better 
discrimination among theories than testing payout volumes.  22 
 
(on the margin), and therefore do not respond to taxes on payout. According to the old view, all firms 
finance their investment externally (again, on the margin), and therefore respond to taxes on payout (their 
cost of capital increases in such taxes). We hypothesize that the two assumptions fit different firms. By 
sorting firms by access to the equity market, we may be able to test the two theories. We attempt to sort 
firms into those that can source funds in the equity markets (old view) and firms that have to rely more on 
internal resources to finance investment (new view). To classify firms, we use three methods: predicted 
equity issues, actual equity issues in preceding years, and the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of 
financial constraints. We cannot condition on payout to distinguish financially constrained vs. 
unconstrained firms, since payout may be determined simultaneously with investment (the dependent 
variable).  
We estimate the effect of taxation on the cash flow sensitivity of investment separately for two the 
groups of firms. In Table 9, Panel A, we sort firms based on the predicted probability that a firm issues 
shares using common share free float, share turnover, sales growth, leverage, market capitalization and 
market-to-book. We define firms as old view firms if predicted equity sales are above 2% of lagged 
assets. In Panel B, we define firms as old view firms if the sum of the net proceeds from the sale/issue of 
common and preferred stock over the preceding year exceeded zero, and as new view firms otherwise. In 
Panel C, we follow Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and classify firms as new view if the firm is within the two 
lowest quintiles of age and size distribution in one country-year. For all three classifications, there is a 
sizable difference in the effect of taxation on the marginal source of funds for investment between old 
view firms and new view firms. The differences between the coefficients are statistically significant at the 
5% level or better in each pair of regressions. Our results are robust to alternative measures of financial 
constraints. For example, in Table A.X of the Appendix, we classify firms based on the KZ index (Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997). For old view firms, the cash flow coefficient is always sensitive to tax rates, as 
predicted. For new view firms, the coefficient estimate is positive but smaller and insignificant in all 
cases.
18 
5.4. Financial investments (cash holdings) 
So far – given the definition of our dependent variables – our tax wedge theory predictions have 
shown to hold for investments in the production technology of the firm. If certain pre-conditions are met, 
it is natural to expect that the implications of the tax wedge theory are not that different for cash 
investments. For example, there could be a difference in returns or tax rates between corporations and 
owners. In this case, corporate cash holdings could be desirable if corporations can get after-tax higher 
                                                      
18 The results in Table 9 are robust to using the dividend tax rate and the country-weighted effective tax rate 
instead of the country-weighted average tax rate for this analysis (Tables A.XI and A.XII of the Appendix).  23 
 
return than owners. Therefore, lower payout taxes may allow external equity-dependent firms to increase 
their cash investment just as physical investment. To be specific, for cash-constrained firms, an increase 
in payout taxes should shift cash investments towards firms with high cash flow.   
We test the model’s implications for cash investments empirically. To do so, and in line with previous 
literature (see, for example, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004 on cash flow sensitivities of cash), 
we first isolate those firms that are financially constrained. We identify financially constrained firms by 
the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index. As, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), in the absence of 
financial constraints we expect no systematic patterns in cash policies because changes in cash holdings 
for unconstrained firms should depend neither on current cash flows nor on future investment 
opportunities. We further focus on country-years with high probability that corporations can get after-tax 
higher return than owners. This is the prerequisite for holding cash inside the firm to be more tax efficient 
than distributing it to shareholders. We focus on tax rate differentials – by comparing corporate tax rates 
to taxation of interest income of private individuals. To do so, we first collect OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development) (2012) data on statutory tax rates for personal income. We 
then identify country-years where the top personal income tax rate exceeds the corporate income tax by at 
least 3%, generating – all else equal – a non-trivial tax advantage to keeping cash inside the firm for tax 
reasons. To further avoid potentially confounding effects from the strong interrelationship between 
corporate tax and income tax in full imputation systems we focus only on observations from country-
years with non-imputation systems.  
Table 10 presents linear regression results for cash holdings, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. 
We find, as predicted, that for financially constrained firms in corporate tax advantaged country-years, 
cash investment is statistically significantly affected by payout taxes as predicted and shown earlier for 
physical investment. Specifically, for financially-constrained (external equity-dependent) firms an 
increase in payout taxes shifts cash investments towards firms with high cash flow. The estimated 
magnitudes of these effects are large and even greater than the earlier results seen for physical investment. 
For example, going from the 25th percentile of the country-weighted effective tax rate (7.8%) to the 75th 
percentile (25.2%) implies that the effective coefficient on cash flow increases by 0.1235, an increase by 
65.5% over the conditional estimate at the 25th percentile. As predicted, these effects cannot be observed 
for non-financially-constrained firms. 
6.  Robustness tests 
We next turn to several important additional robustness tests. One concern about our results is that tax 
changes are associated with other policy changes, which change firms’ investment behavior. After all, 
governments are unlikely to set their tax policies completely independently of other developments in an 
economy. In particular, our regressions and non-parametric tests might be biased if tax changes were 24 
 
motivated by factors related to the relative investment of cash-rich and -poor firms. If, for example, 
taxation, cash flow and investment all change simultaneously in response to other macroeconomic 
determinants or government policies then we need to be concerned about endogeneity. Throughout our 
analyses we have used a number of checks to ensure robustness of our results to endogeneity concerns. 
For example, in our non-parametric test we have relied on differences in investment across firms instead 
of investment levels. Similarly, in all regressions we include country-year dummies to ensure that average 
investment is taken out (and, likewise, any particular government investment initiative that may inflate 
investment in a given year). Nevertheless we turn to several important additional robustness checks 
below. They address concerns that tax rates change in response to policy variables or macroeconomic 
determinants that might also affect the allocation of investment across firms (thus causing false positive 
conclusions about taxation). 
6.1. Tax systems  
We now consider further features of the tax system. We first want to control for the corporate tax rate. 
Corporate taxes may be connected to payout taxes for many reasons, including government budget trade-
offs, and political preferences (i.e. pro-business). Corporate taxes might also affect how important internal 
resources are for firms.
19 Therefore, if different features of the tax code are correlated, an empirical link 
between payout taxes and relative investment across firms might be reflective of a true relationship 
between corporate taxes and relative investment. To make sure our results are not biased in either 
direction we include the interaction of corporate tax with firm cash flows. Here, we need to make a 
distinction between imputation system and other tax regimes. In imputation systems, corporate and 
payout taxes are particularly strongly intertwined as corporate tax at the firm level is “pre-paid” on behalf 
of shareholders and can be credited against payout taxes at the individual shareholder level. Thus, the 
corporate tax rate is in some way a measure of investor taxes. 
To distinguish tax systems we thus also add an interaction of cash flow*corporate tax with the 
dummy variable Imp, which takes the value of 1 for imputation systems, and zero otherwise. The results 
are reported in Table 11. The interaction of corporate tax with cash flow is insignificant in all 
specifications, suggesting that outside of imputation systems, the corporate tax rate is not related to our 
findings. The triple interaction with the imputation system dummy is positive and significant, suggesting 
that in imputation systems, internal cash flow is a stronger predictor of investment when taxes are high. In 
other words, internal resources appear to matter more when corporate taxes are high. One interpretation of 
this coefficient is that when taxes are high, financial constraints bind more than at other times (see e.g. 
                                                      
19 For example, if many firms are financially constrained, they may be unable to respond to lower corporate tax 
rates by investing more. In that case, lower tax rates may coincide with lower coefficients on internal resources. 25 
 
Rauh 2006). Importantly for our purposes, the interaction of cash flow and payout tax is not much 
affected. The coefficient estimates remain significant (although the significance is somewhat lower for the 
dividend tax rate), and very close to the baseline regressions in magnitude. 
6.2. Public finance  
Apart from corporate income taxes, we are also concerned about other features of the tax system. 
Changes to payout taxes may coincide with modifications to the tax code apart from the corporate tax 
rate. We therefore introduce a set of broad measures of public sector policy as covariates, which may 
make investment more profitable. More generally, this way we can address legislative endogeneity 
concerns: if firms with little internal equity increase investment following a payout tax reduction, is that 
because of the tax cut or did these firms just lobby to make the investment they were planning to do 
anyway more profitable? We collect alternative indicators of policy preferences for the economies in our 
sample from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). We opt for four indicators that 
measure government policy in three distinct dimensions: government stimulus, consumption climate, and 
legal environment. We sequentially include each policy control and its interaction with cash flow. To 
control for the effect of government stimulus programs that may affect investment we use control 
variables Subsidies, Grants, Social Benefits and Military Expenditure. The former measures government 
transfers on current account to private and public enterprises, and social security benefits in cash and in 
kind (relative to total government expense) (Table 12, Panel A). The latter includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces (relative to GDP) (Panel B). We measure governments’ stance on 
consumption through control variable Sales and Turnover Tax. It measures the tax burden on goods and 
services relative to the value added of industry and services (Panel C).
20 Finally, we measure public 
spending on research through R&D Expenditures as a fraction of GPD. It measures expenditures on basic 
research, applied research, and experimental development (Panel D). We use the more demanding flexible 
specifications to perform this additional check. Coverage for the world development indicators is 
generally poorer than for our tax variables over the sample period. In three of the four additional 
specifications the number of observations is at best half compared to our baseline specifications. Despite 
the reduction in sample size and the additional policy controls the coefficient for the cash flow*tax 
interaction remains strong and significant in most specifications. 
6.3. Substitutes for equity finance 
At the firm-level, a final source of concern is related to the source of external financing. Firms may 
try to substitute into debt funding of new investment if equity is expensive, as pointed out above (Section 
                                                      
20 It includes general sales and turnover or value added taxes, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use of 
goods or property, taxes on extraction and production of minerals, and profits of fiscal monopolies. 26 
 
2.4). Presumably, not all firms are able to do so, e.g. because they cannot access debt markets or because 
their leverage is already high. Whether substitution into debt is prevalent enough to offset the predictions 
of our model is an empirical question. Looking at actual leverage, we find little effect of tax changes on 
book leverage ratios (Table A.XIII of the Appendix). This suggests that debt does not provide a complete 
substitute for equity finance.
21  
6.4. Measurement error in Q 
Our final concern relates to the potential impact of measurement error in investment opportunities on 
our results (e.g., Almeida, Campello and Galvao, 2010; Erickson and Whited, 2000 and 2012). The 
empirical proxy for Tobin’s q – the ratio of equity market value plus debt book value to book assets – 
captures average Q, whereas marginal Q should be more closely related to investment opportunities.  
Also, the inputs used to calculate Q (e.g., the stock price) are noisy. Therefore, Q is likely a noisy 
measure of investment opportunities. The measurement error biases the coefficient on Q towards zero and 
the explanatory power loads on independent variables correlated with Q (in this case cash flow, which 
when interacted with taxation is the variable of interest). In our baseline, the coefficients on Q and on 
cash flow are possibly biased because of measurement error. However, under the assumption that 
measurement error in Q is not correlated with tax rates, our coefficient of interest (the interaction of cash 
flow and tax rates) is unbiased.  
Even if this identifying assumption is plausible, we would like to address this more carefully. The 
literature identifies three estimators to remedy potential biases in regression coefficients due to 
measurement error in investment: instrumental variables (Almeida, Campello and Galvao, 2010; Rauh 
2006), the dynamic panel estimators from Arellano and Bond (1991), and the high-order moment 
estimators due to Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002). Table 13 contains results for robustness to 
measurement error in Q for each estimator (the table only reports the coefficient of interest; each reported 
coefficient corresponds to a regression). In line with Almeida, Campello and Galvao (2010) we use Q 
lagged twice, and Q lagged twice and Cash Flow lagged twice, as instruments for investment for the first 
estimator (Almeida, Campello and Galvao, 2010). For the EW high-order moment estimator we present 
results for the third, fifth and seventh moment. In these latter specifications, we demean variables by 
                                                      
21 We would also like to compare the response to taxes between firms with and without access to debt funding. 
For this, we would ideally sort firms based on unused debt capacity (predicting a smaller response for firms with 
good access to alternative funding). Unfortunately, this is challenging to implement empirically. Actual use of debt 
is not a priori a good candidate for estimating unused debt capacity. First, pecking order concerns will lead some 
firms to take on debt only if they have to, so that firms with high leverage may end up with less unused debt 
capacity than those with low leverage. A better measure would be something like the amount of unencumbered 
collateralizable assets, but this is not visible in the type of accounting data we have. 27 
 
country-year and by firm to account for firm- and country-year fixed effects.
22 Coefficient estimates for 
the CashFlow*Tax interaction are quantitatively very similar to our baseline results for all three 
estimators, and highly statistically significant. These regression results raises our confidence that the 
baseline results are not driven by measurement error in Q.  
7.  Conclusions 
Our results have three main implications. First, it appears that payout taxes drive the allocation of 
capital across firms. High taxes lock in capital in those firms that generate internal cash flows, ahead of 
those firms that need to raise outside equity. The cost of capital, especially for firms with much equity 
(low leverage), could be very sensitive to tax rates on payout for some firms, as well as heavily dependent 
on access to internal equity when payout taxes are high. We estimate economically large effects of payout 
taxes. This corresponds to recent trends in the amounts raised by various taxes. From 1960 to 2009, the 
share of corporate income taxes in aggregate U.S. Federal tax receipts fell from 24% to 10% (IRS 2009). 
A study by the Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis suggested that individual income 
taxes on dividends were 13% of Federal tax receipts in 2005. In other words, payout-related taxes may 
currently raise more revenue than corporate income taxes in the U.S. 
Second, the impact on investment allocation makes payout taxes an important policy tool. If firms 
have different investment opportunities, our results mean that tax rates change the type of investments 
being made. Tax policy offers a tool for affecting the access to investment resources by firms without 
retained earnings. For example, high payout taxes may favor established industries while low taxes favor 
new industries.  
Third, the well-known relation between cash flow and investment (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, 
Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont, 1997) may partially reflect the difference in the cost 
of capital between firms with and without access to inside equity. Firms invest more if they have easy 
access to more resources (see e.g. Lamont, 1997 and Rauh, 2006), especially internal cash flows. Our 
results point to a tax channel generating (a part of) this effect: having internal cash flows implies a lower 
after-tax cost of equity capital.  
                                                      
22 The potential necessity of this adjustment is evident in, for example, Almeida, Campello and Galvao (2010, 
p. 3321), who highlight that “because real-world investment data contain firm-fixed effects and heteroskedasticity, 
the EW estimator delivers coefficients that are unstable across different specifications and not economically 
meaningful”. Demeaning our dependent and independent variables, we create a dataset that takes fixed effects into 
consideration and at the same time fulfills the requirements of the EW estimator. 28 
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Figure 1 
Personal Tax Rates on Dividend Income – High Variation Countries 
This figure shows dividend tax rates for the six countries in our sample with the largest within-country variation in 
personal income tax rates on dividend income over the 1990-2008 period. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Capital Gains Tax Rates – High Variation Countries 
This figure shows taxation of share repurchases for the six countries in our sample with the largest within-country 
variation in tax rates on capital gains over the 1990-2008 period. 
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Figure 3 
Tax Rates – Distribution over Sample 
This figure illustrates the distribution of tax rates across 81,222 observations in our sample over the 1990-2008 
period. The graph is a transposed cumulative distribution function with number of observations on the x-axis and tax 
rates on the y-axis. Dividend Taxis the personal income tax rate on dividends (in %). Effective Tax C is the country-
weighted effective corporate payout tax rate (in %). It is obtained by weighting each year’s dividend and effective 
capital gains tax rates by the relative importance of dividends and share repurchases as payout channels (relative to 
total corporate payout) in a country over the sample period. The effective tax rate on share repurchases equals one-
fourth of the statutory capital gains tax rate. Average Tax C is an alternative measure of the average corporate 
payout tax rate (in %). It is calculated by weighting each year’s dividend and statutory capital gains tax rates by the 
relative importance of dividends and share repurchases as payout channels (relative to total corporate payout) in a 
country over the sample period.  
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Figure 4 
Difference in Average Investment of High and Low Cash Flow Firm around Payout Tax 
Changes of at Least 3 Percentage Points, 1992-2006 
This figure shows differences in average investment between high cash flow firms and low cash flow firms for three 
years around 15 payout tax decreases and 14 payout tax increases in 1992-2006 with at least 30 observations in the 
country-year. We measure investment by capital expenditures normalized by prior-year total assets and demean 
investment by country-year cell. We sort firms in each country-year cell into five quintiles according to their cash-
flow, and calculate average investment for each quintile. The black line shows the difference in investment between 
high and low cash flow firms around payout tax increase events. The green line shows the difference in investment 
between high and low cash flow firms around payout tax decrease events. The 14 payout tax increase events are 
Australia 1993, Canada 1993, Denmark 1993 Denmark 2001, Germany 1994, Germany 1995, Finland 2005, Finland 
2006, France 1997, Japan 2000, Norway 2006, Poland 2004, Switzerland 1998, and the US 1993. The 15 tax 
decrease events include Belgium 2002, Canada 1996, Canada 2001, Canada 2006, Germany 2001, France 2002, 
Italy 1998, Japan 2004, Netherlands 2001, Poland 2001, Spain 1996, Spain 1999, Spain 2003, US 1997, and the US 
2003. 
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Figure 5 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Empirical Distribution 
This figure presents the empirical distribution of difference-in-difference estimates around tax increase and decrease 
events. Events are included if they represent a 3 percentage points or larger change in the tax rate, if there are at least 
30 firm observations for each year around the change, and if they occur during 1992-2006. For each event, we sort 
firms in each year into five groups based on cash flows. For each year, the difference in the average investment to 
lagged assets between the firm quintiles with the highest and lowest cash flows is calculated. The difference-in-
difference estimate for each event is defined as the change in this difference from the three years before to the three 
year after the tax change. The graph presents tax decreases and increases separately.  
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Table 1 
Tax Regimes Across 25 Countries (1990-2008) 
This table reports prevailing tax regimes across 25 countries over the 1990-2008 period. CL, FI, PI, SR, and TE abbreviate classical corporate taxation system, full 
imputation system, partial imputation system, shareholder relief system, and dividend tax exemption system, respectively. 
1 – Split-rate system for distributed and 
retained earnings. 
2 – Individuals had the option to accumulate the dividend grossed up applying a factor of 1.82 combined with a tax credit of 35% on the grossed 
up dividend. This mechanism is similar to a full imputation system (Source: OECD). 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia  FI  FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI 
Austria  SR  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Belgium  SR  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Canada  PI  PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI 
Denmark  CL  CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL SR SR SR SR 
Finland  PI  PI PI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI  FI  FI SR SR SR SR 
France  FI  FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI  FI  FI SR SR SR SR 
Germany FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 FI
1 SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Greece  -  -  TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE TE 
Hungary  SR  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Ireland  PI  PI PI PI PI PI  PI  PI  PI  PI CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL 
Italy  FI  FI FI FI FI FI  FI  FI SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Japan  CL  CL CL CL CL CL CL CL SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Korea  PI  PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI 
Mexico FI
2 FI
2 TE TE TE TE TE TE TE FI  FI  FI  FI FI FI FI FI FI FI 
Netherlands  CL  CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
New  Zealand  FI  FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI 
Norway  SR SR FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI FI PI FI FI FI FI SR  SR  SR 
Poland  -  -  -  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Portugal  SR  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Spain  CL  CL CL CL CL  PI  PI  PI  PI  PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI SR  SR 
Sweden  CL  SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
Switzerland  CL  CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL SR SR 
United  Kingdom  PI  PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI 
United  States  CL  CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL SR SR SR SR SR SR 
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Table 2 
Personal Income Tax Rates and Capital Gains Tax Rates Across 25 Countries (1990-2008) 
This table shows effective corporate payout tax rates across 25 countries over the 1990-2008 period. Panel A reports personal income tax rates on dividend income 
(in %). Panel B reports capital gains tax rates (in %). All capital gains tax rates reported are effective rates incurred by investors with non-substantial shareholdings 
and holding periods that qualify as long-term investments in accordance with country-specific tax legislation. For example in Denmark, Germany or the United 
States, capital gains from long-term shareholdings are taxed at the lower rate reported in Panel B. Austria, Italy, and Netherlands are examples for countries where 
capital gains from substantial shareholdings are taxed at higher rates. A shareholding qualifies as substantial if it exceeds a certain threshold in share capital (for 
example 5% in the Netherlands). See Jacob and Jacob (2011) for a detailed description of applied tax rates. 
Panel A: Personal Income Tax Rates on Dividend Income (in %) 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia  15.2 15.2 15.2 23.0 23.0 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 22.0 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 23.6 23.6 23.6 
Austria  25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Belgium  25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Canada  38.3 39.1 40.1 43.5 44.6 44.6 37.0 35.8 34.6 33.6 33.2 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 24.4 24.1 23.6 
Denmark  60.9 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 45.0 
Finland  59.5  55.6  55.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  16.0  19.6  19.6  19.6 
France  39.9 39.9 39.9 41.8 41.8 42.6 39.0 43.4 41.9 41.9 40.8 40.1 35.6 33.5 33.9 32.3 32.7 32.7 32.7 
Germany  26.6 29.7 29.7 26.6 32.9 38.5 38.5 38.5 37.0 37.0 34.0 25.6 25.6 25.6 23.7 22.2 22.2 23.7 26.4 
Greece  -  -  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary  20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 25.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 
Ireland  35.8 35.7 32.0 30.7 30.7 32.0 32.5 34.4 39.3 39.3 44.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 41.0 41.0 
Italy  21.9 21.9 23.4 23.4 23.4 23.4 22.2 22.2 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Japan  35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 43.6 43.6 43.6 43.6 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Korea  47.3 47.3 47.3 47.3 38.4 37.0 33.4 33.4 33.4 22.7 22.7 33.4 28.1 28.1 28.1 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.1 
Mexico  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands  60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 22.0 25.0 
New  Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.9  12.9 
Norway  25.5  23.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  28.0  28.0  28.0 
Poland  -  -  -  20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 
Portugal  25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Spain  46.0 46.0 43.0 46.0 46.0 38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 18.0 18.0 
Sweden  66.2 30.0 30.0 30.0  0.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Switzerland  40.9 40.9 41.5 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.1 41.5 41.0 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 25.7 
United  Kingdom  20.0 20.0 20.0 22.6 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
United  States  28.0 31.0 31.0 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.1 38.6 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 37 
 
Panel B: Capital Gains Tax Rates (in %) 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia  48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 23.3 23.3 23.3 
Austria  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium  41.0 39.0 39.0 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Canada  35.1 35.7 36.3 38.6 39.3 39.3 39.0 37.1 36.3 35.9 31.9 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  0.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 45.0 
Finland  23.8 27.8 27.9 25.0 25.0 25.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 
France  19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.9 19.9 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 30.1 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Greece  -  -  -  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary  20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0  0.0  0.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Ireland  40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Italy  25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Japan  35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Korea  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mexico  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands  60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
New  Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Norway  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  28.0  28.0  28.0 
Poland  -  -  40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 44.0 40.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 
Portugal  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain  11.2 11.2 10.6 37.3 37.3 37.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 18.0 18.0 
Sweden  33.1 30.0 25.0 25.0 12.5 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Switzerland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 42.4 42.4 42.1 41.5 41.0 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 25.7 
United  Kingdom  40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 18.0 
United  States  28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 38 
 
Table 3 
Sample Overview and Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of 7,661 firms in 25 countries for 1990-2008 presented in Panel A. Summary statistics for 
investment variables are presented in Panel B. Investment refers to capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-
of-year t-1 assets. PPE Growth refers to growth in plant, property, and equipment from t-1 to t divided by the end-
of-year t-1 assets, and Asset Growth is defined as the growth rate of assets over the prior year. Summary statistics 
for independent variables are presented in Panel C. Dividend Taxis the personal income tax rate on dividends (in 
%).Effective Tax C is the country-weighted effective corporate payout tax rate (in %). It is obtained by weighting 
each year’s dividend and effective capital gains tax rates by the relative importance of dividends and share 
repurchases as payout channels (relative to total corporate payout) in a country over the sample period. The effective 
tax rate on share repurchases equals one-fourth of the statutory capital gains tax rate. Average Tax C is an alternative 
measure of the average corporate payout tax rate (in %). It is calculated by weighting each year’s dividend and 
statutory capital gains tax rates by the relative importance of dividends and share repurchases as payout channels 
(relative to total corporate payout) in a country over the sample period. Cash Flow is the ratio of cash flow in year t 
relative to prior year total assets. Cash is defined as cash holdings over prior year assets. EBITDA measures earnings 
before interest, tax, and depreciation in year t as a fraction of t-1 total assets. Q is defined as the market-to-book 
ratio, that is, the market value divided by the replacement value of the physical assets of a firm. Sales Growth is the 
logarithm of the growth rate of sales from t-2 to t. Leverage is the ratio of year t total debt to prior year total assets, 
and Size is the relative firm size measured as the percentage of firms in the sample that are smaller than this firm. All 
variables are in real USD (base year 2000). 
Panel A: Sample Overview 
Country N(Firms)  N(Obs) Country  N(Firms) N(Obs)  Country    N(Firms) N(Obs) 
Australia 261  1,879    Hungary  13 111 Poland  70 403
Austria 26  332    Ireland  18 252 Portugal  28 269
Belgium 38  463    Italy  66 925 Spain  41 577
Canada 320  2,525    Japan  2,071 22,347 Sweden  100 1,112
Denmark 65  867    Korea  477 4,528 Switzerland  85 1,136
Finland 57  727    Mexico  39 401 UK  470 6,054
France 212  2,608    Netherlands 68 894 USA  2,720 28,439
Germany 245  3,067    New  Zealand  31 272 Total 7,661 81,222
Greece 99  519    Norway  41 515  
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Investment 
 N  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10
th 
Percentile Median 
90
th 
Percentile 
Investment 81,222  0.0594  0.0676  0.0083  0.0398  0.1271 
PPE Growth  77,626  0.0805  0.2364 -0.1377  0.0514 0.2898 
Asset Growth  81,222  0.0785  0.3128 -0.1702  0.0338 0.3079 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
  N Mean  St.  Dev.  10
th %  Median  90
th % 
Dividend Tax  81,222  27.7640 12.5679 10.0000 30.0000  43.6000 
Effective Tax C  81,222  18.2530 9.1225  7.6536 17.5143  31.9932 
Average Tax C  81,222  24.1584 10.3002 10.0000 26.9082  38.0938 
Cash Flow  81,222  0.0696  0.1043  -0.0217  0.0720  0.1767 
Cash 81,222  0.1480  0.1883  0.0127  0.0922  0.3409 
EBITDA 81,222  0.0957  0.1139  -0.0066  0.1008  0.2138 
Q 81,222  2.1270  2.9255  0.7524  1.2183  4.0391 
Sales Growth  81,222  0.1114  0.3924  -0.2719  0.0896  0.5080 
Leverage 81,222  0.2607  0.2345  0.0031  0.2276  0.5313 
Size 81,222  0.6306  0.2404  0.2800  0.6571  0.9363 39 
 
Table 4 
Average Investment and Cash Flow around Payout Tax Changes 
Panel A of this table shows the average investment for bottom and top quintiles of cash flow to assets around 14 
payout tax increases (Average Tax C) in 1990-2008 of at least 3 percentage points and with at least 30 observations 
in the country-year. Panel B illustrates the difference in investment between top and bottom cash flow quintiles 
around 15 payout tax decreases. We measure investment by capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-of-year 
t-1 assets. The table also shows the difference between groups and periods, and the difference-in-difference 
estimate. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. The 29 tax events are listed in Figure 4.  
Panel A: 14 Tax Increase Events 
  Low Cash Flow Firms   High Cash Flow Firms Difference between Groups
  (1)    (2) (3) 
Pre-reform Periodt-4;t-1 -0.0230***    0.0307***   0.0533*** 
  (0.0015)   (0.0038)   (0.0046) 
Post-reform Period t;t+2 -0.0278**   0.0481***    0.0759*** 
 (0.0025)    (0.0037)    (0.0051) 
Difference between 
Periods 
-0.0048*  0.0173***    0.0226*** 
(0.0029)   (0.0053)   (0.0069) 
Panel B: 15 Tax Decrease Events 
  Low Cash Flow Firms   High Cash Flow Firms Difference between Groups
  (1)    (2) (3) 
Pre-reform Periodt-4;t-1 -0.0232***    0.0495***   0.0727*** 
  (0.0024)   (0.0035)   (0.0046) 
Post-reform Period t;t+2 -0.0163***    0.0390***   0.0554*** 
 (0.0029)    (0.0030)    (0.0042) 
Difference between 
Periods 
0.0068*  -0.0105**    -0.0173*** 
(0.0038)   (0.0046)   (0.0062) 40 
 
Table 5 
Firm Investment and Internal Resources under Various Tax Regimes 
This table reports linear regression results for firm investment behavior, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The 
dependent variable is Investment, defined as capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-of-year t-1 assets. We use 
Cash Flow as a measure of firm’s availability of internal resources for investment. Cash Flow is the ratio of cash flow 
in year t relative to prior year total assets. See Table 3 for a description of the other independent variables included in 
the regressions. In column (1) we measure firms’ tax burden on corporate payouts (Tax) as the personal income tax rate 
on dividends (Dividend Tax). Column (2) uses the country-weighted effective tax rate (Effective Tax C), and column (3) 
employs the country-weighted average tax rate (Average Tax C). Country-year interaction indicator variables are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by 
country-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Effective Tax Rate 
 Country-Weighted   
Average Tax Rate 
 (1)  (2)    (3) 
Cash Flow*Tax  0.0009** 0.0021***    0.0017*** 
(0.0004) (0.0006)    (0.0005) 
Cash Flow  0.0749***  0.0644***    0.0599*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0101)    (0.0123) 
Sales Growth  0.0157***  0.0156***    0.0156*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)    (0.0011) 
Leverage 0.0374***  0.0373***    0.0373*** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)    (0.0029) 
Size 0.0025  0.0031    0.0030 
 (0.0040)  (0.0040)    (0.0040) 
Q 0.0011***  0.0011***    0.0010*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Country-year FE  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Observations 81,222  81,222    81,222 
R-squared 0.5779    0.5781    0.5781 
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Table 6 
Firm Investment and Internal Resources under Various Tax Regimes –  
Alternative Measures 
This table reports linear regression results for firm investment behavior, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The 
dependent variable is Investment, defined as capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-of-year t-1 assets. We use 
two alternative measures of firm’s availability of internal resources for investment. Cash is defined as cash holdings 
over prior year assets (columns (1), (3), (5)). EBITDA measures earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation in year t 
as a fraction of t-1 total assets (columns (2), (4), (6)). See Table 3 for a description of the other independent variables 
included in the regressions. In columns (1) and (2) we measure firms’ tax burden on corporate payouts (Tax) as the 
personal income tax rate on dividends (Dividend Tax). Columns (3) and (4) use the country-weighted effective tax rate 
(Effective Tax C), and columns (5) and (6) employ the country-weighted average tax rate (Average Tax C). Country-
year interaction indicator variables are included in all specifications. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
  Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Effective Tax Rate 
Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cash*Tax  0.0005**   0.0006*    0.0005*   
(0.0002)   (0.0003)    (0.0002)   
EBITDA*Tax   0.0003    0.0010**   0.0009** 
 (0.0003)    (0.0004)    (0.0003) 
Cash 0.0014    0.0060    0.0028   
 (0.0060)    (0.0054)    (0.0063)   
EBITDA   0.0395***    0.0319***    0.0283*** 
   (0.0085)    (0.0075)    (0.0089) 
Sales Growth  0.0213**  0.0188***  0.0213**  0.0188***  0.0213**  0.0188*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) 
Leverage 0.0331**  0.0366***  0.0331**  0.0366***  0.0332**  0.0365*** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0031)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0030) 
Size 0.0062  0.0038  0.0060  0.0042  0.0062  0.0041 
 (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0041)  (0.0040) 
Q 0.0013**  0.0013***  0.0013**  0.0013***  0.0013**  0.0013*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 81,222  81,222  81,222  81,222  81,222  81,222 
R-squared 0.5688  0.5707  0.5687  0.5708  0.5687  0.5708 
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Table 7 
Firm Investment and Internal Resources under Various Tax Regimes –  
Flexible Specifications  
This table reports linear regression results for firm investment behavior, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The 
dependent variable is Investment, defined as capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-of-year t-1 assets. We use 
Cash Flow to measure firms’ availability of internal resources for investment. Cash Flow is the ratio of cash flow in 
year t relative to prior year total assets. See Table 3 for a description of the other independent variables included in the 
regressions. In column (1) we measure firms’ tax burden on corporate payouts (Tax) as the personal income tax rate on 
dividends (Dividend Tax). Column (2) uses the country-weighted effective tax rate (Effective Tax C), and column (3) 
employs country-weighted average tax rate (Average Tax C). Country-year interaction indicator variables are included 
in all three specifications. We also include the interaction of Cash Flow with both country and year indicator variables. 
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country-years. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Effective Tax Rate 
Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Cash Flow*Tax  0.0011** 0.0027***  0.0021*** 
(0.0005) (0.0008)  (0.0006) 
Sales Growth  0.0158***  0.0157***  0.0157*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Leverage 0.0373***  0.0372***  0.0372*** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
Size 0.0035  0.0040  0.0038 
 (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040) 
Q 0.0009***  0.0009***  0.0009*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE*CashFlow  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country FE*CashFlow  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 81,222  81,222  81,222 
R-squared 0.5803  0.5805  0.5804 
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Table 8 
External Equity Financing and Tax Regimes 
This table presents linear regression results for external financing behavior, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The 
dependent variable is the value of new equity issues to start-of-year book value of assets. Observations where the 
dependent variable exceeds 0.15 are excluded. See Table 3 for a description of the independent variables included in the 
regressions. In column (1) we measure firms’ tax burden on corporate payouts (Tax) as the personal income tax rate on 
dividends (Dividend Tax). Column (2) uses the country-weighted effective tax rate (Effective Tax C), and column (3) 
employs the country-weighted average tax rate (Average Tax C). Coefficient estimates are based on baseline 
specifications with country-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
  Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
 Country-Weighted   
Average Tax Rate 
 (1)  (2)    (3) 
Tax  -0.0001*** -0.0002***    -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Cash Flow  -0.0088***  -0.0089***    -0.0088*** 
 (0.0031)  (0.0031)    (0.0031) 
Stock Price 
Appreciation 
0.0112*** 0.0112***    0.0112*** 
(0.0009) (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Sales Growth  0.0048***  0.0047***    0.0047*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)    (0.0006) 
Leverage 0.0085***  0.0085***    0.0085*** 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)    (0.0017) 
Size 0.0073***  0.0072***    0.0072*** 
 (0.0025)  (0.0025)    (0.0025) 
Q 0.0006***  0.0006***    0.0006*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Firm FE  Yes    Yes    Yes 
Observations 33,280  33,280    33,280 
R-squared 0.3819    0.3815    0.3819 
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Table 9 
Old and New View Firms and the Link between Payout Taxes and Cash Flow 
 
  
This table presents coefficient estimates for Cash Flow*Tax interaction using the country-weighted average tax rate 
(Average Tax C). We define firms as old view firms if predicted net proceeds from the sale/issue of common and 
preferred stock to lagged assets exceeds 2% (Panel A) or if previous years’ sales of shares divided by lagged book assets 
exceeded zero (Panel B) or if the firm has low financial (using the Hadlock and Pierce Index of financial constraints). 
Firms with high financial constraints are defined as firms who are below median of firm age and firm size. We predict 
issues of common stock by common share free float, share turnover, sales growth, leverage, market capitalization and 
Tobin's q. b is the coefficient estimate, (se) is the heteroskedasticity-robust standard error clustered by country-years, t-
stat is the t-statistic of the significance of coefficient b, and n is the number of observations. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Predicted Equity Issues 
Category b  (se)  [t-stat]  N 
New view firms;  
 predicted equity issues < 2%  0.0012 (0.0009)  [1.36]  21,781 
Old view firms;  
 predicted equity issues > 2%  0.0029*** (0.0009)  [3.12]  19,137 
Panel B: Previous year Equity Issues 
Category b  (se)  [t-stat]  n 
New view firms; 
 last year equity issues = 0   0.0012 (0.0008)  [1.54]  24,306 
Old view firms;  
 last year equity issues > 0  0.0027*** (0.0008)  [3.27]  31,684 
Panel C: Hadlock and Pierce Index of Financial Constraints 
Category b  (se)  [t-stat]  n 
New view firms;  
low financial constraints  0.0009 (0.0012)  [0.74]  30,992 
Old view firms;  
high financial constraints  0.0026*** (0.0009)  [3.01]  15,781 45 
 
Table 10 
Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash and Tax Regimes  
This table presents linear regression results for cash holdings, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The dependent 
variable is the change in the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. We measure firms’ tax burden on corporate payouts as 
the personal income tax rate on dividends (Dividend Tax), the country-weighted effective tax rate (Effective Tax C), the 
country-weighted average tax rate (Average Tax C). Coefficient estimates are based on baseline specifications with 
country-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered by country-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  High Financial Constraints, No 
Imputation System, and  
Corporate Tax Advantage > 3% 
  Low Financial Constraints, No 
Imputation System, and  
Corporate Tax Advantage > 3% 
 DivTax  EffTaxC  AvgTaxC    DivTax  EffTaxC  AvgTaxC 
Tax*Cash Flow  0.0048**  0.0071**  0.0067*    0.0032  0.0037  0.0025 
 (0.0023)  (0.0034)  (0.0035)    (0.0026)  (0.0031)  (0.0025) 
Cash Flow  0.1086*  0.1333**  0.0948    0.0934  0.1181**  0.1231* 
 (0.0617)  (0.0552)  (0.0662)    (0.0791)  (0.0562)  (0.0630) 
Sales Growth  -0.0642***  -0.0642*** -0.0642***    -0.0233*** -0.0232***  -0.0231*** 
 (0.0179)  (0.0179)  (0.0179)    (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0064) 
ΔLeverage 0.1293***  0.1292***  0.1292***    0.1198***  0.1197***  0.1198*** 
 (0.0293)  (0.0292)  (0.0293)    (0.0151)  (0.0150)  (0.0150) 
Size 0.0787  0.0743  0.0744    -0.0145  -0.0176  -0.0193 
 (0.0555)  (0.0545)  (0.0540)    (0.0224)  (0.0238)  (0.0238) 
Q 0.0065***  0.0065***  0.0064***    0.0035***  0.0035***  0.0035*** 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)    (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-Year FE  Yes  Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,510  6,510  6,510    29,042  29,042  29,042 
R-squared 0.2831  0.2828  0.2830    0.1880  0.1878  0.1876 
 
Table 11 
Firm Investment and Internal Resources under Various Tax Regimes – 
Control for Corporate Income Tax 
This table replicates regressions for investment behavior from Table 4, estimated over the 1990-2008 period, but 
features the corporate tax rate as an additional explanatory variable for investment. Corporate Tax is the statutory tax 
rate on corporate income. We additionally interact CashFlow, CashFlow*CorporateTax, and CorporateTax with the 
indicator variable Imp, which is equal to 1 for imputation tax systems and zero otherwise. Baseline regression controls 
are as in Table 4. Country-year interaction indicator variables and interactions between the corporate tax rate and cash 
flow are included in all specifications. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered by country-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
Cash Flow*Tax  0.0007*  0.0012**  0.0015*** 
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
CashFlow* 
CorporateTax 
0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
CashFlow*Imp* 
CorporateTax 
0.0048** 0.0045** 0.0044** 
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Baseline Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 81,222  81,222 81,222 
R-squared 0.5788  0.5788  0.5788 46 
 
Table 12 
Impact of Taxation on the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment –  
Robustness to Other Macroeconomic Determinants of Investment  
This table reports coefficients for the cash flow*tax interaction in the linear regressions for firm investment behavior, 
estimated over the 1990-2008 period. Regression specifications are as in Table 5 but additional macroeconomic 
determinants of investment are included as controls. Those are Subsidies, Grants, Social Benefits, which include all 
government transfers on current account to private and public enterprises, and social security benefits in cash and in 
kind (Panel A); Military Expenditure as a fraction of GDP, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the 
armed forces (Panel B), Sales and Turnover Tax, which measure taxes on goods and services as a fraction of value 
added of industry and services (Panel C); and the R&D Expenditure as a fraction of GDP, which includes all 
expenditures for research and development covering basic research, applied research, and experimental development 
(Panel D). Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country-years. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dividend Tax Rate  Country-Weighted  
Effective Tax Rate 
Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Subsidies, Grants, Social Benefits 
Cash Flow *Tax  0.0012  0.0026***  0.0018** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Observations 41,577 41,577  41,577 
R-squared 0.6044  0.6048  0.6045 
Panel B: Military Expenditure 
Cash Flow *Tax  0.0008**  0.0021***  0.0016*** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0006)  (0.0005) 
Observations 81,222 81,222  81,222 
R-squared 0.5780    0.5781    0.5781 
Panel C: Sales and Turnover Tax 
Cash Flow *Tax  0.0009  0.0024**  0.0012* 
 (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0007) 
Observations 39,608 39,608  39,608 
R-squared 0.6019    0.6021    0.6019 
Panel D: R&D Expenditure 
Cash Flow *Tax  0.0004    0.0011*    0.0009* 
 (0.0003)    (0.0005)    (0.0005) 
Observations 61,963    61,963    61,963 
R-squared 0.6128    0.6128    0.6128 
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Table 13  
Firm Investment and Internal Resources under Various Tax Regimes - Control for 
Measurement Error in Q 
This table reports linear regression results for firm investment behavior, estimated over the 1990-2008 period. The 
dependent variable is Investment, defined as capital expenditure in year t divided by the end-of-year t-1 assets. See 
Table 3 for a description of the other independent variables included in the regressions. In column (1) we use twice 
lagged Q as instrument for Q. Column (2) uses two lags of Q and CF as instruments. In Column (3) we use dynamic 
panel estimators from Arellano and Bond (1991). In Column (4) to (6) we use the Erickson and Whited (2002) higher 
order moment estimator and present results for the third, fifth and seventh moment. In specifications (1) to (3), we 
include firm- as well as country-year fixed effects. In specifications (4) to (6), we demeaned variables by country-year 
and by firm to account for our fixed effects. Baseline controls are included in all specifications. Standard errors (shown 
in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 IV  Estimation  Arellano 
and Bond 
Estimator 
EW Estimator 
 Q t-2 Q t-2 and CFt-2 GMM3 GMM5 GMM7 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dividend Tax Rate  0.0006*** 0.0007***  0.0010***  0.0006**  0.0005*  0.0007** 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Country-Weighted  
Effective Tax Rate 
0.0016***  0.0017***  0.0019***  0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 
(0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Country-Weighted  
Average Tax Rate 
0.0012*** 0.0013***  0.0018*** 0.0011** 0.0009**  0.0012*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
 
 
  